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CAN THE IRS SILENCE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS?

MEGHAN J. RYAN*

As the campaign season for the 2008 presidential election begins, politicians
are already courting religious organizations, which will certainly again play a
crucial role in the election's outcome.' During the last political campaign season,
religious organizations engaged in what some would characterize as unsavory
politicking.2 For instance, a Baptist church backed a ban on gay marriage in a
nationally televised Sunday service,3 a Catholic cardinal declared that individuals
wearing rainbow sashes to church to identify themselves as homosexuals would
be denied communion,4 and a bishop distributed a letter to his parishioners
stating that any Catholic who votes for a political candidate supportive of
abortion, same-sex marriage, or stem-cell research should be denied communion.5
Most notably, the Archbishop of Boston threatened to deny presidential
candidate John Kerry communion in the Catholic Church because of Kerry's
political view on abortion. 6 Churches, however, did not act alone in exploiting
issues infused with both religious and political elements. In an effort to mobilize

* Associate, Dorsey & Whitney LLP. E-mail: mjryan@post.harvard.edu. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Gregg Polsky, Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Ryan Miske, C. Michael Geise, Ryan Stai, and Jana Bruder for their helpful
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., David Espo, Democrats Urged to Court Churchgoers,STAR TRIB., June 29,
2006 (noting that Senator Barack Obama stated that the Democratic party "must compete for the
support of evangelicals and other churchgoing Americans"); see also Terry Eastland, Houses of
Worship: The Moral Majority, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2004, at W17 (stating that moral values was
the determining issue in how many voters cast their ballots in the 2004 presidential election); cf.
Laurie Goodstein, Minister,a Bush Ally, Gives Churchas Site for Alito Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2006 (reporting that a Philadelphia minister who pledged his support for a Bush presidency in 2000
offered his church as a site for a major political rally intended to "whip up support" for Bush's
Supreme Court nominee Alito).
2. The Wall Street Journalstated that much of this was fueled by right-wing Christians
hoping to bolster presidential candidate George W. Bush, as well as other Republicans, in the 2004
election and to draw attention away from the Catholic Church's sex abuse scandals. Albert R.
Hunt, Playing Politicsat the Altar, WAL ST. J., May 27, 2004, at A2 1.
3. In Brief, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2004, at B09.
4. Hunt, supra note 2.
5. Id. Remarkably, this same bishop neglected to mention the death penalty or the Iraq war
as worthy of excommunication. Id. The Catholic Church opposes both of these issues. See John
Harwood, Bush May Be Hurtby Handling of Death-PenaltyIssue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at
A28; Hunt, supra note 2. These issues, however, were integral to the Bush campaign. Hunt, supra
note 2.
6. See Gerald F. Seib, The CatholicVote Becomes MetaphorforPolarizedViews, WALLST.
J., Oct. 20,2004, at A4 (noting that Kerry supports abortion rights); Editorial, Bishops at the Ballot
Box, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 2004, at A20. Some evidence suggests, however, that most
Catholics strongly oppose using communion as a political weapon and that this actually helped John
Kerry, the Democratic candidate, in the race. Hunt, supra note 2.
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incumbent President George W. Bush's religious supporters, the Bush campaign
requested religious volunteers nationwide to turn over church directories to the
campaign, distribute campaign literature, persuade their churches to hold voter
registration drives, talk to seniors in the church about President Bush, recruit
more volunteers for the campaign, and host campaign-related potluck dinners
with church members.7
After various organizations protested this intermixing of religion and politics,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") responded.8 It sent a letter to both the
Republican and Democratic national committees, warning that the tax-exempt
status of a religious organization could be revoked if the organization engaged
either directly or indirectly in political activities.9 Indeed, the IRS has revoked
the tax-exempt statuses of religious organizations in the past for impermissibly
intervening in political campaigns." ° Further, beginning around the time of the
2004 presidential election, the IRS increased its monitoring of potentially
improper political activities by tax-exempt religious organizations." As of
December 2005, the IRS was working to clear approximately 130 cases from the
2004 presidential election involving possible violations of § 501(c)(3) by taxexempt organizations, including approximately fifty churches. 2 It is difficult to
determine exactly how many of these religious organizations will lose their taxexempt statuses because the IRS is legally prohibited from disclosing the details
and the names of the organizations it investigates.' 3 However, the IRS has
revealed that at least one-third of its investigations for impermissible intervention
in political campaigns involve religious organizations. 1" With this increased IRS
attention, religious organizations must now be mindful that their messages do not
contain impermissible political content, lest they risk losing their tax-exempt

7. NationalBriefing PulpitPolitics: Bush Politicking Between the Pews Once Again, AM.
POL. NETWORK, July 1, 2004, at 20. The "instruction sheet" that the Bush campaign circulated
listed twenty-two "duties" for the religious volunteers to perform by specific dates. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cit. 2000) (approving
the IRS's revocation of a church's § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status because the church impermissibly
intervened in a political campaign). Further, three tax-exempt organizations are expected to lose
their tax-exempt statuses as a result of their politicking during the 2004 campaign season. See IRS
FindsProhibitedPoliticalActivity in Majority of Exempt Group Exams, 74 U.S.L.W. 2524, 2524
(Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter IRS Finds ProhibitedPoliticalActivity].
11. Mike Allen, NAACP Faces IRS Investigation, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A08.
12. IRS to Finish 2004 Election Cases on PoliticalInterventionAmid Debate, 74 U.S.L.W.
2335, 2335 (Dec. 6, 2005). Recently, the IRS warned a California church that it could lose its taxexempt status because a guest preacher gave an anti-war sermon on the eve of the 2004 presidential
election. Church: Anti-war Sermon Imperils Tax Status, CNN.coM, Nov. 7, 2005, http:llwww.
phillyblog.com/philly/showthread.php?t= 2329.
13. Genaro C. Armas, 60 Tax-Exempt Groups Under Investigation; at Issue Are IRS
Regulations That Bar PoliticalActivities, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2004, at A04.
14. See id.
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statuses.15
Various scholars speculate as to whether the religious organizations under
investigation indeed violated the IRS limitations on politicking, 6 and if they did,
whether such standards are constitutionally permissible. 17 In this debate,
proponents of the IRS regulations argue that in light of the test generally applied
in free exercise cases, the IRS regulations cannot be invalidated on that ground.'8
Opponents of the IRS regulations highlight religious organizations' interests in
stating their religious beliefs, which may coalesce with what the IRS would
consider political. 9 Scholars, however, have overlooked the possibility of
attacking the IRS regulations on the ground of a Smith hybrid claim,20 which
ratchets up the level of scrutiny when both free exercise and free speech concerns
are implicated.2'
This Article argues that the IRS regulations applying the § 501(c)(3)

15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Allan Samansky & Donald Tobin, Point-Counterpointon Election Activities
of Churchesand Charities,ELECTION LAW @ MoRrrz, Aug. 24, 2004, http://moritzIaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/comments/2004/040824.php (debating whether § 501(c)(3) dictates that churches
should lose their tax-exempt statuses when they deny members communion because of the way they
vote or when they clearly support one political candidate over another).
17. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship andReligious Liberty: Constitutional
Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REv. 401, 493 n.343
(1991) (noting that the constitutionality of § 501 (c)(3)'s limitations on political participation could
be questioned); Samansky & Tobin, supra note 16 (debating the constitutionality of any limitation
that would prevent § 501(c)(3) religious organizations from incidentally espousing political
messages).
18. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 22 CuMB. L. REv. 521, 567, 586 (1992). Similarly, IRS Commissioner
Mark Everson has stated that "[flreedom of speech and religious liberty are essential elements of
our democracy .... But the [U.S.] Supreme Court has in essence held that tax exemption is a
privilege, not a right, stating that 'Congress has not violated [an organization's] First Amendment
rights by declining to subsidize its First Amendment Activities."' IRS Finds ProhibitedPolitical
Activity, supranote 10 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,548 (1983))
(alterations in original).
19. See, e.g., Samansky & Tobin, supra note 16 (arguing that leaders of religious
organizations should be free to point out the moral components of public issues without risking
their § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt statuses); Deborah Zimmerman, Note, Branch Ministries, Inc. v.
Rossotti: FirstAmendment Considerationsto Loss of Tax Exemption, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 249,265
(2003) (outlining church's free speech and free exercise interests).
20. A Smith hybrid claim involves both a free exercise claim and a free speech claim. See
generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (outlining the Smith hybrid claim),
supersededby statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 107 Stat.
1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct.
1211(2006).
21. See generally id. (explaining that a heightened level of scrutiny applies when both free
exercise and free speech claims are involved); infra Part III.B.
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limitation on intervening in political campaigns must be more deferential when
applied to religious organizations so as not to be vulnerable to invalidation under
a Smith hybrid claim. Part I outlines the § 501(c)(3) limitation on intervention
in a political campaign, as well as the IRS regulations used to determine whether
organizations are engaged in prohibited intervention in political campaigns. It
notes that religious organizations are treated no differently than other
organizations under these regulations.
Part II explains that, in some
circumstances, withholding a tax benefit from an organization simply because the
organization exercises its constitutional rights may be an unconstitutional burden
on that organization. Part III summarizes the constitutional test applied to free
exercise claims and explains how a stricter level of scrutiny applies when free
speech claims are also at issue. It argues that due to the unclear line between
religious and political issues, the IRS regulation compels religious organizations
to remain silent on issues that are both religious and political. This chills
religious organizations' freedom of political and religious speech and burdens
their free exercise of religion. The combination of these burdens makes the
IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) unconstitutional under a Smith hybrid claim.
Part IV suggests that to avoid this constitutional difficulty, the IRS should defer
to religious organizations' bona fide claims that messages are religious when the
messages play such dual roles. Additionally, the IRS should clarify how it will
apply § 501 (c)(3) so religious organizations' actions are not chilled by uncertain
fears of losing their tax-exempt statuses.22

I. SECTION 501(c)(3) AND THE IRS's CORRESPONDING REGULATIONS LIMIT
POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY § 501 (c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) and corresponding IRS regulations
prevent tax-exempt organizations from engaging in political activities 2. 3 The taxexempt status of § 501(c)(3) is reserved for organizations "which do[] not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
'
candidate for public office."24
This prohibition against political campaign
intervention is absolute; there are no de minimus exceptions to the rule.2"
Organizations that do not adhere to the limitations on engaging in political

22. Although this Article focuses on the vulnerability of the IRS's application of§ 501(c)(3)
under the constitutional framework set forth in Smith, perhaps an even stronger argument for
deference can be made under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. See supra note 20.
23. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
24. Id. The statute also provides that § 501 (c)(3) organizations may not have any part of their
net earnings "inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual," or devote a substantial
part of their resources to attempting to influence legislation. Id.
25. United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1989). But see BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 584 (8th ed. 2003) (comparing § 501(c)(3)
to § 610 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which is absolute on its face but has been found to
allow de minimus exceptions).
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activity are referred to as "action" organizations and are not entitled to the tax
exemption conferred by § 501(c)(3).2 6 If found in violation of the § 501(c)(3)
limitation on intervening in a political campaign, the IRS will revoke the
organization's § 501 (c)(3) status indefinitely.27 The action organization will lose
its tax-exempt status for that year and will have to re-apply for its tax-exempt
status if it hopes to have it reinstated the following year.28 Additionally, in
instances where action organizations egregiously violate the rules applying to
tax-exempt organizations, the IRS may revoke their tax-exempt statuses
retroactively.29 This means that the organizations may be taxed for the year in
which their tax-exempt statuses are revoked, as well as for previous years.3"
Further, the IRS may also apply penalty taxes to the organizations, requiring
them to pay sums of up to $15,000, depending on the nature of the violation.3a
The lack of meaningful legislative history as to what constitutes
impermissible intervention -in a political campaign makes the § 501(c)(3)
limitation difficult to apply.32 This limitation, which was added to § 501(c)(3)
without the benefit of congressional hearings, 3 was introduced as a floor

26. See I.R.C. § 501 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (2000). Although "action"
organizations are not entitled to § 501(c)(3) statuses, they may still be entitled to § 501(c)(4)
statuses. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2000) (providing that organizations not organized for
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare and devoting their earnings
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes, are entitled to tax-exempt statuses).
Unlike § 501(c)(3) organizations, § 501(c)(4) organizations may attempt to influence political
campaigns or engage in more targeted issue advocacy without risking their tax-exempt statuses.
See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHwARz, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 335-38

(2003). While taxpayers who contribute to a § 501(c)(3) organization may deduct the amount of
their contributions on their federal income tax returns, contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations
may not be deducted. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000).
27. See generallyHOPKINS, supranote 25, at 654-63, 684-99 (explaining the consequences
of engaging in behavior prohibited by the guidelines for tax-exempt statuses).
28. See id.
29. See generallyid. at 659-63 (explaining the consequences of retroactive revocation of an
organization's tax-exempt status).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 600-02.
32. See Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic:A PrincipledApproach to Section
501(c)(3) 's Prohibitionof PoliticalCampaignActivity, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 504,516 (1999) ("The
absence of any meaningful legislative history for the political activities provisions of § 501(c)(3)
further complicates matters."); see also ROBERT L. HOLBERT, TAX LAW AND POLUTIcAL ACCESS 27
(1975) (noting that the legislative history pertaining to the enactment of § 501(c)(3) is "skimpy").
While there is no clear legislative history regarding the enactment of this limitation on political
activity, it may be linked to the fundamental principle of the separation of church and state. See
Benjamin S. De Leon, Note, Rendering a Taxing New Tide on I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): The
Constitutional Implications of H.R. 2357 and Alternatives for Increased PoliticalFreedom in
Houses of Worship, 23 REV. LITIG. 691, 695 (2004).

33. See Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code
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amendment and adopted in the Senate.34 Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas
offered the amendment out of concern that funds provided by a certain charitable
foundation had been used to help finance the campaign of his opponent in a
senatorial primary election.35 Perhaps the only useful legislative history lending
insight into the purpose of the provision is a House Report that expresses a
congressional policy that the U.S. treasury should be neutral in political affairs
and thus should not subsidize political activity.36 While the original form of the
bill prohibited only "partisan politics," this phrase was deleted prior to the law's
enactment.37 Still, this notion of3partisanship
is reflected in the courts' and IRS's
8
interpretations of the limitation.
In the context of religious organizations, courts have readily approved the
IRS's revocation of tax exempt statuses when flagrant political activity has been
at issue.39 Courts have not, however, had the opportunity to rule in situations
involving less egregious activity by religious organizations.' Therefore, courts
have not had to delineate the scope of the § 501(c)(3) limitation as applied to
religious organizations. The primary case in which a court confronted the
question of whether a religious organization impermissibly intervened in a
political campaign is Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti.4' There, the D.C.
Circuit approved the IRS's revocation of a church's § 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt status
because the organization placed full-page advertisements in two newspapers that
urged Christians not to vote for presidential candidate Bill Clinton because of his
positions on certain moral issues.42 The court did not expound on whether less
egregious activities by religious organizations would contravene the limitations
set forth in § 501(c)(3).4 3 Similarly, in ChristianEchoes NationalMinistry, Inc.

Prohibits;Why; To What End?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 903, 905 (2001).
34. See Colleen T. Sealander, Standing Behind Government-SubsidizedBipartisanship,60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1580, 1635 (1992).
35. See id. at 1635-36.
36. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1624-25 (1987), as reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-1205 (noting that the IRS should strengthen its enforcement efforts in policing the § 501(c)(3)
limitations).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1385,3-4, 17, 19 (1934); S. REP. No. 73-558,26 (1934); 78 CONG.
REc. 7831 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 5959 (1934).
38. See infra notes 53-56.
39. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ruling on
whether a church impermissibly intervened in a political campaign).
40. Given that most appeals regarding the revocation of an organization's tax-exempt status
result in settlements, courts rarely rule on whether an organization has engaged in proscribed
political campaigning. For a discussion of IRS settlements and the settlement process, see Leandra
Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?:An EmpiricalStudy of Predictorsof Failureto Settle, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 315, 341 (1999) (explaining that "many tax cases never make it to court
because they are resolved by the IRS Appeals Office before they are ever docketed").
41. See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 139-42.
42. Id. at 140-42.
43. See id. (analyzing whether the IRS has the authority to revoke the tax-exempt status of
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v. United States, the Tenth Circuit approved the IRS's revocation of a church's
§ 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt status, but did not clarify the scope of the prohibition on
intervening in a political campaign. 4" In that case, a religious organization
attacked President Kennedy for being too liberal and urged its members to elect
conservatives such as Senator Strom Thurmond.45 As in Branch Ministries,the
court did not explore the limits of § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on intervening in a
campaign outside of the egregious activities at issue.' Therefore, these cases
give little guidance to religious organizations as to whether § 501(c)(3) permits
them to convey messages to their members that have both religious and political
components.
The IRS has attempted to clarify the prohibition on intervening in a political
campaign by issuing regulations and technical advice memoranda on the issue.47
In Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii), the IRS states that prohibited
activities "include, but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of
written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in
opposition to... a candidate."4 " However, the IRS has not limited violations of
§ 501(c)(3) to instances in which organizations explicitly advocate the election
or defeat of a clearly-identified candidate.49 The IRS fears that this would allow
an organization to surreptitiously intervene in a political campaign by using
"code" language to support a candidate,50 thus allowing too much electioninfluencing activity among § 501(c)(3) organizations.5 ' Instead, the IRS has
determined that even issue advocacy may rise to the level of prohibited
intervention if it is employed in the midst of a hotly contested political campaign
so as to impliedly endorse or oppose a candidate.52
In determining whether an activity is prohibited under § 501(c)(3), the IRS
generally draws a line between activities that are conducted in a nonpartisan
manner and those that are not. 3 Prohibited activities under § 501(c)(3) include

a bona fide church, whether the revocation violated the First Amendment, and whether selective
prosecution on the part of the IRS violated the Equal Protection Clause).
44. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855-56 (10th
Cir. 1972).
45. Id. at 856.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) (determining that an
organization's fundraising letters constituted prohibited intervention in a political campaign).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
49. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 26, at 333; Judith E. Kindell & John F. Reilly,
Election Year Issues, FY 1993 IRS EXEMPT ORG. CONTINUING PROF'L EDUC. TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 400, 410-11 (1992), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/

eotopicn93.pdf.
50. Kindell & Reilly, supra note 49, at 411.
51. See Editorial, Free Speech vs. Tax Code, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2004, at A14.
52. See FISHMAN & ScHwARz, supra note 26, at 333.
53. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 591 ("A traditional distinction between political
campaign activity and voter education activity has been that the latter is nonpartisan.").
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political action committees and financial support of a candidate.54 Activities that
may be permissible if conducted in a nonpartisan manner include educational
activities, voter guides, candidate questionnaires, public forums, voter drives, and
inviting candidates to speak at an organization's event.5" If conducted in a
partisan manner, however, engaging in any of these activities is grounds for
In Technical Advice
revoking an organization's tax-exempt status.56
Memorandum 91-17-001, for example, the IRS determined that an educational
organization impermissibly intervened in a political campaign when it urged its
members to vote for "the progress of the last 3-1/2 years. 57 The IRS concluded
that the organization's audience would have known that the organization
supported President Ronald Reagan's reelection, making the phrase tantamount
to specifically urging the audience to vote for President Reagan. 51 Similarly, the
IRS's application of § 501 (c)(3) indicates that if a religious organization argues
that abortion is immoral, this may constitute untoward politicking if a particular
candidate in a controversial election has identified this issue as central to his
campaign platform.59 In such a case, preaching on the issue may be considered
tantamount to supporting a particular candidate in the race. 60
Despite the IRS's attempt to clarify the scope of the § 501(c)(3) limitation
on intervening in a political campaign, organizations remain unclear as to which
activities may constitute impermissible intervention in a political campaign. 6,
This is especially true with respect to religious organizations. 62 This may be due,
in part, to differing messages from Congress and the IRS as to the scope of the
§ 501(c)(3) limitation as applied to religious organizations. In the hearings on
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Congress expressed uncertainty as to
whether a single standard to measure the political activities of all § 501(c)(3)
organizations was appropriate. 63
The notion that § 501(c)(3) religious organizations should be treated
uniquely can be found throughout the Tax Code. For example, unlike other
organizations, religious organizations are presumed to be exempt and need not

54. See generallySteven B. Imhoof, Note, The Politicsof PolitickingUnderJRC § 501(c)(3):
A Guidefor PoliticallyActive Churches, NEXUS 97, 100-01 (Fall 2000) (articulating guidelines
for religious organizations to follow in avoiding revocation of their tax-exempt statuses).
55. See id. at 101-05.
56. Id.
57. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Apr. 26, 1991).
58. See id.
59. See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 49, at 410-11.
60. See generally id. (outlining the parameters of permissible issue advocacy).
61. See Brian Faler, Falwell on 'Thugs' and Taxes, WASH. PosT, Aug. 6, 2004, at A06.
62. See id. (reporting that Jerry Falwell was to hold a conference to educate church leaders
as to what they may say during religious services without losing their tax-exempt statuses).
63. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1624-25 (1987), as reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-1205 (questioning whether it is appropriate or feasible for the IRS to utilize a single standard
in determining § 501(c)(3) violations).
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file applications for determination of this status.' Additionally, religious
organizations need not file annual financial information returns," and they have
various immunities and protections from IRS audits.' Yet, the IRS appears to
treat religious and nonreligious organizations alike when interpreting and
applying the § 501(c)(3) limitation on intervention in political campaigns.67 It
makes no- distinction between organizations accorded an additional layer of
protection under the Free Exercise Clause and. those accorded no additional
protection."
fl. WITHHOLDING A TAX BENEFIT CAN BE A BURDEN ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In some circumstances, denying a tax exemption to a claimant for exercising
its constitutional rights-for example speech or religious rights-is
unconstitutional.6 9 This withholding of a tax benefit from an organization is
known as an unconstitutional condition.7" In Speiser v. Randall,for example, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]o deny [a tax] exemption to claimants who engage
in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its
deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech."'"
The Court thus invalidated a California requirement that property tax exemptions
for veterans would be available only to those who would declare that they did not
advocate the forcible overthrow of the government.72
In other circumstances, however, the Court has held that denying an
organization a tax benefit is a mere nonsubsidy and thus does not violate the
Constitution.73 For example, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the
Court upheld § 501(c)(3) limitations as applied to a nonreligious organization

64. I.R.C. § 508(c) (2002) (amended Aug. 17, 2006).
65. Id. § 6033(a)(2)(A)&(C); IRS, Tax-Exempt Statusfor Your Organizations,Publication
557, 8 (Mar. 2005).
66. See generally I.R.C. § 7611 (2002) (listing restrictions on the IRS in initiating tax
inquiries of churches).
67. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 1990) (declining to
distinguish between religious organizations and other § 501(c)(3) organizations).
68. Cf.id.
69. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 528-29 (1958) (holding that a law
conditioning veterans' tax benefits on veterans swearing not to advocate the forcible overthrow of
the government is unconstitutional).
70. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 333-34 (2d
ed. 2003).
71. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518.
72. Id. at 528-29.
73. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,541-51 (1983) (holding
that the limitations of § 501(c)(3) as applied to an educational organization do not
unconstitutionally infringe on that organization's free speech rights).
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engaged in lobbying for tax reform.74 The Court held that Congress is not
required to provide tax-exempt organizations public money with which to
lobby." It reasoned that Congress's "decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict
fundamental
scrutiny.''76 The Court noted that the organization in question had the option of
segregating its tax-exempt activities from its political activities by creating a
separate § 501(c)(4) organization to engage in its political activities.77 The
organization was not penalized for engaging in political speech because it could
still do so under its sister § 501(c)(4) entity; the government just refused to
subsidize-that speech.78 In FederalCommunications Commission v. League of
Women Voters of California, however, the Court held that a noncommercial
educational broadcasting station could not pragmatically segregate its political
and tax-exempt activities into distinct § 501 (c)(3) and § 501 (c)(4) organizations;
therefore, a law conditioning federal funding on the station's forbearance of its
right to editorialize was determined to be an unconstitutional penalty.79

While the Court's jurisprudence in this complex area of unconstitutional
conditions remains murky, it is clear that withholding a tax benefit from an
organization can be an unconstitutional penalty in some cases. 0 While scholars
continue to debate which factors cause a condition to be a penalty instead of a
nonsubsidy,8 l it seems that a law is considerably more likely to be labeled as an
unconstitutional penalty when it is difficult for an organization to segregate its
tax-exempt actions from its political actions under the law. 2

74. Id. at 545-46 (holding that § 501(c)(3) limits do not impose an "unconstitutional
condition" on free speech).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 549 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
77. Id. at 544.
78. Id.at 546. The distinction between the government penalizing speech and not subsidizing
speech is vital in free speech challenges. The former almost certainly renders a statute
unconstitutional, whereas the latter almost always ensures that the statute will be upheld. See, e.g.,
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202-03 (1991) (upholding speech-restrictive, abortion-related
conditions on family planning subsidies); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,528-29 (1958) (finding
unconstitutional a California statute that provided for property tax exemptions only for veterans
who would declare they did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the government).
79. FCC v. League of Woman Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984).
80. See, e.g., id. But see IRS Finds ProhibitedPoliticalActivity, supra note 10 (noting the
IRS Commissioner's reference to the Supreme Court's holding that a tax exemption is a privilege
and that Congress does not violate an organization's First Amendment rights by refusing to
subsidize its First Amendment activities).
81. See, e.g., Lisa Babish Forbes, Note, FederalElection Regulation and the States: An
Analysis of the Minnesota andNew HampshireAttempts to Regulate CongressionalElections,42
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 509, 543 n. 185 (1992) (explaining that "commentators are by no means of
one mind as to the essential characteristics of such [an] analysis").
82. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518; see also
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1307 (2006) (suggesting
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Ill. THE IRS's APPLICATION OF § 501(c)(3) TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
PRESENTS UNIQUE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Limiting an organization's political activities presents distinct First
Amendment concerns when applied to religious organizations because the Free
Exercise Clause imposes additional constitutional protections when religious
organizations are involved.8 3 Religious and political issues are so intertwined in
some instances that it is difficult to separate religious messages from political
ones.84 This blending of political and religious speech and actions exacerbates
the free speech and free exercise concerns implicated when applying § 501 (c)(3)
and the IRS's corresponding regulations to religious organizations.8 5 Even if
each of these burdens, alone, is not enough to rise to a constitutional level, the
compounding of free speech and free exercise concerns makes the IRS
regulation
86
applying § 501(c)(3) ripe for challenge under a Smith hybrid claim.
A. The Line Between Religious and PoliticalIssues Is Difficult to Draw
Application of § 501 (c)(3) requires the IRS to distinguish between political
and other activities.8 7 This distinction must be made even when the two activities
are closely intertwined. 8 In the educational context, for example, the IRS must
determine whether the slogan "vote for the progress of the last 3-1/2 years" is an
educational or a political message.89 While the distinction may be relatively clear
in this example, categorization can be exceedingly difficult in the context of
messages that are arguably both religious and political.
The blending of religion and politics makes distinguishing political activity
from religious activity extremely difficult. "Religion and politics have been
intertwined since the birth of our nation."' The motto "In God We Trust" on our

that the distinction between an unconstitutional condition and a constitutional nonsubsidy is
whether the condition could have been constitutionally imposed directly).
83. The Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting... the free
exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. See infra Part III.A.
85. See infra Part III.B. But see Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,550
(1983) (holding that § 501(c)(3) as applied to a tax-exempt organization is not an unconstitutional
condition on free speech). The freedom of speech difficulties that § 501(c)(3) poses apply to all
§ 501 (c)(3) organizations. See infra Part III.B. 1. These concerns are heightened in the context of
religious organizations because freedom of religion issues are also present. See infra Part II.B.2.
86. See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (outlining the hybrid
claim); infra Part II.B.
87. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) (determining that an
organization's fundraising letters constituted prohibited intervention in a political campaign).
88. See id.
89. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Apr. 26, 1991); see supra text accompanying notes
57-58.
90. Judy Ann Rosenblum, Note, Religion and PoliticalCampaigns: A Proposal to Revise
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currency and the phrase "Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance evidence this
presence of religious elements in political life." During 2004, this political
intertwinement took center stage with, for example, churches denying
communion to members for voting for a particular political candidate or
announcing that they would do so. 92 The denial of communion to church
members is an exclusively religious act.9 3 Urging members to vote for a
particular candidate, however, may constitute intervention in a political
campaign.94 When these political and religious acts are intertwined it is arguable
whether they can be separated into distinct religious and political components.
Religion and politics have become increasingly intertwined.95 Issues that
originally fell solely within the realm of religion have been co-opted by the
political sphere. Politicians pluck contentious moral issues from within what
used to be exclusively the religious domain and use them as a foundation on
which to base their platforms. The issue of abortion, for example, has long been
condemned by both the Jewish and Christian faiths but has only more recently
become an issue of national politics.96 These "moral issues" are then used in an
attempt to court religious constituents. 97 Indeed, exit polls from the 2004

Section 501(c)(3) of the InternalRevenue Code, 49 FORDHAML. REv. 536, 536 (1981) (citing B.
DULCE & E. RICHTER, RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENCY 1-11 (1962)).
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 2 (noting that a Catholic cardinal declared that anyone wearing
a rainbow sash to church to identify himself as a homosexual would be denied communion).
93. See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historicaland Constitutional
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 572 (1992).
94. See generally supra Part I.
95. See TIMOTHY L. FORT, LAW AND RELIGION 33 (1987) (explaining that religion and law
are "inseparably linked" since both are sets of ethics, attempting to govern human behavior); see
also Andrea Pallios, Note, Should We Have Faith in the Faith-BasedInitiative?: A Constitutional
Analysis of PresidentBush's CharitableChoice Plan,30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 131 (2002).
96. See infra note 97. Politicians attempt to profit from preaching on these issues themselves
because issues of morality can be especially moving. See KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND
POLITICS INTHE UNITED STATES 37 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that the potent nature of moral issues has
the ability to mobilize citizens more than economic issues).
97. Religious organizations have historically espoused passionate views on issues such as
abortion and homosexuality. For example, the Jewish faith has emphatically condemned abortion
for over 2000 years, and the Christian faith has opposed abortion for at least 1800 years. See
MICHAEL J. GORMAN, ABORTION & THE EARLY CHURCH 33, 47-48 (Intervarsity Press 1982). In
contrast, abortion has only more recently become a topic worthy of political debate. See Richard
K. Neumann, On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 305 n. 18 (1990) (citing Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,531 (1989)) (suggesting that abortion has only become a political issue
since the Supreme Court handed down the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973); Annotated Legal
Biography on Gender, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 723, 779 (2004) ("The issue of abortion
concerns the needs and demands of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." (quoting Janet L.
Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, andCloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 102
(2003))). Thus, it is only recently that religious groups and politicians have faced off on such
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presidential election indicate that "moral values" was the issue most prevalent on
many voters' minds when they cast their ballots.9"
As a result of the political co-option of religious issues, the body of issues
that may be considered exclusively religious is steadily decreasing. 99 Under the
IRS's current interpretation of § 501 (c)(3), religious organizations cannot safely
speak on issues that may contain both religious and political overtones."° As
such, the body of issues on which religious organizations may safely speak is
similarly decreasing.'' Indeed, organizations that made remarks that lie in the
gray area between religious and political speech during the 2004 presidential
campaign season are currently under investigation or have already received
warnings from the IRS and are at serious risk of losing their § 501(c)(3)
statuses.' °2 Further, the IRS appears to be growing bolder in challenging
religious organizations on their use of arguably political speech. 3 Even if the
IRS was not actively investigating these religious organizations, the
organizations' fears of losing their tax-exempt statuses is often effective in
deterring many of them from promulgating messages that may have both political
and religious components."' Research demonstrates that many § 501(c)(3)
organizations cower in fear of the IRS and avoid any kind of advocacy, even that
which might be permitted.'°
The uncertain line between permitted religious and proscribed political
activities is exacerbated by the ever-growing campaign season. Section 501(c)(3)
prohibits tax-exempt organizations from engaging in activities that could be
interpreted as supporting or opposing a candidate for public office during the
campaign season. 0 6 But in modem times the campaign season is an ongoing

contentious issues.
98. Eastland, supra note 1.
99. Cf Pallios, supra note 95, at 131 (noting that religion and politics are becoming
increasingly more intertwined).
100. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995) (determining that an
organization's fundraising letters constituted prohibited intervention in a political campaign).
101. Even if religious organizations are at fault for the declining body of issues that are
exclusively religious, the fact remains that the number of exclusively religious issues on which
religious organizations may safely speak is decreasing.
102. See Taxation-Exempt Organizations: IRS to Finish 2004 Election Cases on Political
Intervention Amid Debate, 74 U.S.L.W. 2335 (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter IRS to Finish 2004
Election Cases]; Taxation-ExemptOrganizations:IRS Memo Sets Proceduresto Examine Possible
PoliticalActivity by Charities,74 U.S.L.W. 2336 (Dec. 6, 2005).
103. See Allen, supra note 11; see also IRS to Finish 2004.Election Cases, supra note 102
(noting that "[i]n 2004, the IRS created a political intervention project designed to look at all
Section 501(c)(3) groups and their involvement in political campaigns").
104. See Armas, supra note 13.
105. See Jeffrey M. Berry, Who Will Get Caughtin the IRS's Sights?, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,

2004, at B03.
106. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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phenomenon.'0 7 "Candidates for the presidency and Congress now are in a
perpetual campaign mode."' 0 8 When presidents are not overtly campaigning for
reelection, they consider the electoral impact of nearly every policy decision."°
Because § 501 (c)(3) organizations are prohibited from even insinuating that one
candidate is preferred over another-for instance, based on a candidate's stance
on a specific issue-the expanding campaign season further circumscribes a
religious organization's ability to speak within the confines of the IRS
regulations applying the § 501(c)(3) limitation on intervening in a political
campaign."°
B. The Smith Hybrid Claim Triggers Strict Scrutiny When Both Free Exercise
and Free Speech Claims Are Involved
The intertwinement of religion and politics makes for a unique challenge to
the IRS's regulations implementing § 501 (c)(3) under the Free Exercise Clause.
Generally, claiming that a law is unconstitutional on the ground of the Free
Exercise Clause has become difficult since the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith."' There, the Court held that most free exercise2
challenges are subject only to a deferential rational basis standard of review."
The Court carved out an exception, however, when the case involves a colorable
free exercise claim in addition to the claim of another fundamental right, such as
a free speech claim.' 13 Although the Smith Court upheld the statute in question
as constitutional under the First Amendment, it distinguished cases such as
Cantwell v. Connecticut"4 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania"5 by noting that the
facts at issue in Smith only involved a free exercise claim." 6 The Court stated
that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated

107. See generally THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE (Norman J.Ornstein &
Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000) (explaining the causes and consequences of what has become the
"permanent campaign").
108. Id. at vii.
109. Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, The American Presidency: Surviving and Thriving Amidst the
Permanent Campaign, in THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTuRE 108, 115 (Norman J.

Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000).
110. See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 49, at 446-49; supra notes 50-59.
111. 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws are usually
scrutinized under the Free Exercise Clause with a mere rational basis standard).
112. See id.
113. Seeid. at 881.
114. 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (holding unconstitutional the conviction of Jehovah's
Witnesses who were arrested for violating a law that prohibited solicitation).
115. 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (holding unconstitutional, as applied, a law requiring Jehovah's
Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting).
116. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press ....
The Court referred to such a claim as a "hybrid." '" In such cases, strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard to apply," 9 requiring that the statute or regulation at
issue be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 20
Although the Smith Court sought to hand down a bright-line rule, 2' it
neglected to explain in detail exactly what constitutes a hybrid claim. Because
the Court was somewhat vague in Smith, lower courts are divided as to how they
should apply the hybrid claim analysis.' 22 Since the Smith decision, the Supreme
Court has not heard a case in which both a free exercise claim and another First
Amendment claim were at issue. Thus, the Court has not had the opportunity to
clarify the parameters of the hybrid claim.
The majority of circuit courts applying the hybrid claim analysis explain that
each First Amendment claim need only be colorable, and not necessarily
successful in its own right, to prevail under Smith.'23 If the free speech aspect of
the claim is, itself, a sufficient reason to strike down the law in question, then

117. Id.
118. Id. at 882.
119. See id. at 886 n.3 (rejecting the notion that neutral laws of general applicability, which
do not also regulate speech, are subject to a compelling interest analysis); see also April L. Cherry,
The Free Exercise Rights of PregnantWomen Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REv.
563, 608-09 (2002) (noting that hybrid claims are subject to strict scrutiny analysis).
120. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds.,
2001); Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in FirstAmendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1291,
1314(2004).
121. See Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments,Pluralisms,and
the DoctrinalEclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 333, 380 (2004).
122. Courts have differed in how they apply Smith's construct of hybrid claims. See Alan
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
FormalNeutrality, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 119, 187-90 (2002). Some lower courts attempt to interpret
the Court's directive in Smith and give meaning to the notion of a hybrid claim. See, e.g., Swanson
v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the hybrid claim
analysis applies when plaintiffs have a "colorable" claim on the basis of another First Amendment
right in addition to a claim under the Free Exercise Clause). Other courts, however, have rejected
the notion of hybrid claims. See, e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167
(2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the notion of a hybrid claim in Smith was mere dicta); Kissinger v.
Bd. of Tr. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to
a hybrid claim). Still other courts avoid the issue altogether. See Brownstein, supra, at 189. Some
courts have held that the hybrid analysis only applies when plaintiffs can demonstrate that the claim
accompanying the free exercise claim is independently viable. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy &
Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525,539 (1 st Cir. 1995) (holding that the hybrid analysis was not applicable
since plaintiffs failed to state an independently viable substantive due process claim).
123. See, e.g., Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699-700.
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analyzing the claim under the Free Exercise Clause would be superfluous. 24
Similarly, if the free exercise claim, alone, invalidates the law, there is no need
for the free speech component of the hybrid claim.'" Therefore, the Smith Court
contemplated a claim that is independently plausible as both a free exercise claim
and a free speech claim, yet where neither the free exercise nor the free speech
claim would independently give rise to a constitutional violation.'26 Certainly,
neither the free exercise nor the free speech claim can be frivolous.'27 Both
claims may, however, fall short of independently invalidating the law or
regulation at issue.'28 As Professor Brownstein explains, this hybrid claim is best
understood as ratcheting up the standard of scrutiny when each claim
individually is subject to a standard less than strict scrutiny.' 29
Taking the hybrid claim into account, 3 ' the IRS regulation applying the §
501(c)(3) limitation on intervening in a political campaign is a prime target for
invalidation. A challenge to the IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) would be
similar to the free exercise challenges in Cantwell 3' and Murdock,132 which the
Court referred to in its Smith decision. a3 In Cantwell, the Court overturned the
conviction of three Jehovah's Witnesses who were arrested for violating a
Connecticut law that prohibited solicitation. 134 The Court found that the law
deprived the defendants of their free exercise rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and burdened their rights to free speech as well.' 35
Similarly, in Murdock, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law as applied to
Jehovah's Witnesses. 36 The statute required persons canvassing and soliciting

124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 699.
127. If it were possible to make a legitimate hybrid claim when either the free exercise claim
or the free speech claim were frivolous, then the traditional scrutiny afforded such claims when
asserted independently would be undermined.
128. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700.
129. See Brownstein, supra note 122, at 191 (arguing that the problem with the concept of
hybrid rights is not incoherence).
130. CompareMiller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that analysis under
Smith's hybrid claim is appropriate when there is a fair probability or likelihood that each claim
would be successful on its merits), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that the hybrid claim of Smith is
untenable); Michael W. McConnell, FreeExerciseRevisionism and the Smith Decision,57 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1109, 1122-24 (1990) (arguing that the hybrid claim of Smith was not intended to be taken
seriously).
131. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
132. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
133. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,881 (1990); see supratext accompanying notes
114-15.
134. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300-02, 308.
135. Id. at 303-04.
136. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115.
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wares to obtain a license at a fee of about $1.50 per day. 37 The Court stated that
"[i]t could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of [First
Amendment] freedoms would be unconstitutional."' a The Court noted that
dissemination of religious literature and preaching in the streets is accorded the
same level of protection as worshiping in churches.' a9
C. The IRS's Regulation Implementing § 501(c)(3) Violates the First
Amendment Under the Smith Hybrid Claim.
Under the framework created by the Cantwell-Murdock-Smith line of cases,
the IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) to religious organizations creates both a
colorable free speech claim and a colorable free exercise claim under the First
Amendment. This puts the IRS's regulations applying § 501(c)(3) to religious
organizations squarely in the crosshairs of a hybrid claim under Smith, making
it a prime target for ratcheting up the standard of scrutiny.
1. The IRS's Application of § 501(c)(3) Burdens Religious Organizations'
Free Speech Rights.-The IRS's application of the § 501(c)(3) limitation on
intervening in a political campaign chills both political and religious speech by
religious organizations. Certainly, Congress may remove religious organizations
from the list of § 501(c)(3) eligible organizations, but it cannot impose
unconstitutional conditions on their inclusion.14° Under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the threat of revoking a religious organization's tax-exempt
status may be in effect penalizing the organization for its speech and thus
unconstitutional.' 4 ' This would be analogous to Speiser, in which the Court held
unconstitutional the requirement that veterans swear they did not advocate the
42
forcible overthrow of the government as a condition of receiving a tax benefit.
In both instances, the tax benefit depends on the taxpayer's forbearance of a
constitutional right. While the regulation's burden on speech, alone, may not rise
to a constitutional violation, it is at least
a colorable claim which is all that is
143
required under a Smith hybrid claim.
The IRS's application of the § 501(c)(3) limitation burdens religious

137. Id. at 106.
138. Id. at 108.
139. Id. at 109 ("This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim
to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion."). The Court also stated
that sincerity of beliefs was not an issue in this particular case, and the fact that the ordinance was
nondiscriminatory was irrelevant. Id. at 115.
140. Cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) (invalidating the
Posadasde Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), reasoning that "the greater
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising
of casino gambling" (quoting Posadas de PuertoRico Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 345-46)).
141. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
142. See id. at 528-29.
143. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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organizations' free speech rights because such organizations cannot always
effectively separate their religious and political speech. While jurisprudence in
the area of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine remains uncertain, in Regan
and League of Women Voters, the Court distinguished unconstitutional penalties
from constitutional nonsubsidies on the basis of whether the organization's
primary activities could be separated from its political activities and channeled
into distinct § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) entities.'" In Regan, where § 501(c)(3)
was actually involved, the Court held that the law did not unconstitutionally
violate the nonreligious organization's free speech rights because the
organization could create a sister § 501(c)(4) organization to carry out its
political activities. 45 In League of Women Voters, however, a sister § 501 (c)(4)
organization was not possible, thus the governmental limitation on speech was
found unconstitutional.'" Similar to the organization in League of Women
Voters, and unlike the organization in Regan, religious organizations cannot
always effectively segregate their religious messages from their political ones
into the communications of separate § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) entities. 47 For
example, if a preacher states in his sermon that members who vote for pro-choice
political candidates cannot receive communion, 48 it is difficult to separate the
religious from the political messages. The preacher is, in effect, serving a dual
role when he makes that assertion.
Similarly, it would be difficult to separate the sources of funding for each49
component of the statement. While the statement itself costs little to nothing,1
at issue would be the costs of the preacher's salary and the religious
organization's facilities. It would be impractical to require that each component
of the statement be stated in different facilities or to try to determine the fraction
of the preacher's statement that would be attributed to his § 501(c)(4) salary
instead of his § 501(c)(3) salary. This type of religious calculus may be possible
when a religious organization places a newspaper advertisement urging
Christians not to vote for President Clinton because the entire advertisement is
political in nature and there is a separate monetary amount being spent on the
speech. 5 0 However, it is not possible to segregate sources of funding when a

144. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984); Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 541-51 (1983).
145. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.
146. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400.
147. Compare id. (holding that a broadcasting station could not feasibly segregate its
editorializing activities from its other activities), with Regan, 461 U.S. at 541-51 (holding that the
limitations of § 501(c)(3) as applied to an educational organization do not unconstitutionally
infringe that organization's free speech right).
148. Cf Hunt, supra note 2 (noting that a Catholic cardinal declared that persons wearing
rainbow sashes to church to identify themselves as homosexuals would be denied communion).
149. Additionally, because such statements cost little to nothing, the government is no longer
really subsidizing political activity. This means that the government interest behind the § 501 (c)(3)
limitation is at its lowest ebb in these circumstances.
150. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

2007]

CAN THE IRS SILENCE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS?

91

religious organization adopts a position that it will not distribute communion to
members who vote in a particular way. This is similar to the broadcasting station
in League of Women Voters being unable to separate its editorializing activities
from other activities."'5 In both instances, the organization cannot segregate its
activities according to their sources of funding," 2 so the limitation on speech
prevents the organization from espousing the political message while retaining
its tax benefit. Therefore, similar to League of Women Voters, the IRS's
application of § 501(c)(3) prevents religious organizations from espousing
political messages if they hope to retain their tax-exempt statuses for their
religious purposes. 5 3 This is particularly problematic because political speech
has long held an important place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn, for example, asserted that speech on public issues
affecting self-government must be wholly immune from regulation, while private
speech is entitled to less complete protection." 4
The IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) also unintentionally chills religious
speech by religious organizations. The IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) deters
religious organizations from espousing religious messages if they have political
undertones. While the IRS might be able to condition the tax-exempt status on
refraining from engaging in political speech,'5 5 it is constitutionally suspect for
the IRS to simultaneously hinder religious organizations from espousing religious
messages just because they may have political undertones. This is problematic
because of the extensive intertwinement of religious and political issues. Since
a religious organization may not be able to separate its religious speech from its
political speech, it is forced to forego speaking on religious topics that require the
incidental mention of what the IRS might consider to be political speech.
Finally, the § 501(c)(3) limitation as applied to religious organizations also
chills more speech than was at issue in Regan. The tax-exempt organization in
Regan advocated certain views of income taxation before Congress, the
Executive Branch, and the Judiciary.' 56 In contrast, the IRS's application of §
501(c)(3) also includes communications between a religious organization and its
own members. If a preacher urges his congregation to use its power to stop legal
abortions, this involves speech that was not involved in Regan. Therefore, the
IRS's application of § 501 (c)(3) to religious organizations preaching to their own
57
members restricts more political speech than the limitation approved in Regan.'

151. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400.
152. See id. at 400.
153. Cf. id. (holding that a broadcasting station could not feasibly segregate its editorializing
activities from its other activities).
154. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 62-63
(1948).
155. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,541-51 (1983) (holding
that the limitations of § 501(c)(3) as applied to an educational organization do not
unconstitutionally infringe that organization's free speech rights).
156. Id. at 541-42.
157. Cf id. (approving the IRS's revocation of an organization's tax-exempt status where the
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More importantly, however, the IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) to religious
organizations is more constitutionally suspect than in Regan because Regan
involved a nonreligious organization that is not entitled to the same level of
is accorded to religious organizations under the First
protection that
58
Amendment.'
2. The IRS's Application of§ 501(c)(3) Burdens Religious Organizations'
Free Exercise Rights.-The IRS's application of the § 501(c)(3) limitation to
Religious
religious organizations also raises free exercise concerns.
organizations that fear losing their § 501(c)(3) tax statuses are forced to refrain
from espousing religious messages that may have political- undertones because
of the increased intertwinement of religion and politics. 59 Commentators have
recognized that the IRS interpretation of §501(c)(3) is highly intrusive on free
exercise. " Churches, for example, must self-censor as they attempt to walk the
obscure line between loss of exemption and fulfilling their obligation to speak
out on the moral dimensions of important social issues.' 6 ' Some religious
organizations even consider their efforts at influencing public policy "an integral
part of their religious enterprise[s;] [flor some religious persons, political activity
may even be a form of worship."' 62 Consequently, in determining that a message,
which is arguably both political and religious, is impermissibly political, the
IRS's narrow construction of § 501(c)(3) chills religious organizations' free
exercise of religion.
The IRS's application of § 501(c)(3) further infringes on religious
organizations' free exercise rights by infringing on the organizations' autonomy.
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Supreme Court
highlighted the importance of religious organizations' autonomy as part of their
free exercise rights. 63 There, a bishop was defrocked by his church. 6" He then
asked the Court to hold that his termination was defective under the church's
internal regulations. 65 The Court refused, holding that courts cannot
constitutionally determine whether church activities are in accordance with
church doctrine."ta It held that to do so would unconstitutionally burden the

organization was lobbying Congress).
158. See generally id.
159. See Rosenblum, supra note 90, at 542-45.
160. Wilfred R. Coron &Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): PracticalandConstitutional
Implications of "Political"Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & PoL 169, 178 (1985).
161. Id.
162. Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise Clause and the InternalRevenue Code's Restrictions
on the PoliticalActivity of Tax-Exempt Organizations,21 WAKEFORESTL. REv. 395, 396 (1986).
163. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976) (holding that
courts would violate the First Amendment if they were to inquire whether the relevant churchgoverning body has power under religious law to decide disputes).
164. Id. at 705.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 709. The Court stated that permitting courts to determine religious doctrine or
"probe deeply... into [church matters] would violate the First Amendment" Id. (quoting Md. &
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organization's free exercise of religion because churches should be free to
determine their own policies and doctrine.'6 7 In determining whether a religious
organization's message is political instead of religious-when that message could
arguably be categorized as either-the IRS risks infringing upon that
organization's free exercise autonomy rights. It is within the religious
organization's province to determine the nature of its own message when that
message is not clearly political.
While the Supreme Court did place some limitations on a religious
organization's right to speak on religio-political issues in Bob Jones University
v. United States, 168 that case is inapposite here. There, the Court held that a
religious educational organization's tax-exempt status could be revoked if it
prohibited interracial dating by its students because the organization's policy
contravened a compelling governmental interest. 69
' The Court explained that an
organization with such a policy is at odds with fundamental public policy and is
thus not entitled to the tax exemption. 70 The burden on religious liberty was
justified because it was "essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest."''
The Court limited its holding, however, by emphasizing that
determinations of whether public policy trumps religious rights "should be made
only where there is no doubt that the organization's activities violatefundamental
public policy." 72 The Court's holding in Bob Jones University should be
narrowly construed because of its emphasis that laws against racism are essential
to accomplishing an overriding governmental interest.
Unlike the governmental interest at stake in Bob Jones University, the public
interest in preventing preachers from espousing messages with both religious and
political components is not compelling. The prohibition against governmental
support of racial discrimination is absolute. In contrast, the government's
interest in applying the limitation of § 501(c)(3)-avoiding governmental
subsidization of political activity'1 isnot as "overriding" of an interest. In fact,
174
the government does subsidize private political activity in some instances.

Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970)).
167. Id.
168. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
169. Id. at 592-93 (holding that a policy banning interracial dating caused the organization not
to be "charitable" within the meaning of the statute).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,257-58 (1982)) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
173. Further, the government's intent is not clear with respect to the limitations of § 501(c)(3).
See supra note 32. Providing deference to religious organizations in determining whether their
message is political would not raise additional Establishment Clause issues. As in Locke v. Davey,
"there is room for play in the joints" between free exercise and establishment concerns. 540 U.S.
712, 718 (2004). See HOPKiNS, supra note 25, for additional discussion on Establishment Clause
concerns raised by § 501(c)(3).
174. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 9034 (2000) (providing government matching funds for political
candidates who abide by certain spending limitations); see also Richard Briffault, The Futureof
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Further, in situations where the § 501(c)(3) limitation might infringe on religious
organizations' autonomy, any subsidization of political activity is often minimal
because such private communications between organizations and their members
are generally of little to no cost to the government. 175 They are private
76
communications that require no additional expenditure by the organizations.
IV. THE IRS SHOULD DEFER TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS WHEN
THEIR MESSAGES ARE ARGUABLY RELIGIOUS IN NATURE

Despite these unique concerns that arise when § 501(c)(3) is applied to
religious organizations, the statute does not distinguish religious organizations
from the other § 501(c)(3) organizations. 177 On its face, this silence regarding
religious organizations may indicate congressional intent that the same treatment
should be applied to all listed organizations. 7 1 Judicial preference for avoiding
constitutional difficulties, however, favors applying § 501(c)(3) in a manner
79
tailored to the constitutional concerns raised by the Smith hybrid claim.
To avoid a Smith hybrid claim, the IRS should defer to religious
organizations in determining whether their messages are religious in instances
when the organizations promulgate messages that are arguably both religious and
political in nature. This deference would be consistent with the Supreme Court
holding in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.'8 There, the Court held that a New
Jersey anti-discrimination law that would require the Boy Scouts to admit a
homosexual activist to be a troop leader violated the Boy Scouts's constitutional

Reform: CampaignFinanceAfter the BipartisanCampaignReform Act of 2002,34 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1179, 1214-16 (2002) (arguing that the government should provide each candidate with more
public financing than is currently available). Although the government subsidizes candidates'
efforts in running for office, and not the organizations supporting such candidates, the fact that any
financial support is given to candidates indicates that a governmental purpose of not supporting
private political activity is not as fundamental as the governmental purpose of not supporting racial
discrimination.
175. See supra note 149.
176. See supra note 149.
177. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (listing religious organizations along with
organizations such as those operated for charitable, scientific, or literary purposes).
178. One could argue under the canon of construction noscitur a sociis ("it is known by its
associates") that religious organizations should be treated in the same way as the other
organizations listed in the statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004); see WnIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 254 (2000) (explaining

that noscitura sociis means that lists should be viewed as linking similar concepts).
179. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (suggesting that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); ESKREDOE, supra
note 178, at 348-54.
180. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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In its analysis, the Court deferred to the
right of free association.'
organization's assertion that it "teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally
straight" and is thus contrary to "Scout Law."' 8 2 The Court stated that it must
"give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its
expression . . . [and] an association's view of what would impair its
expression."' 83 It was not for the courts to determine whether a message
regarding homosexuality was really a message consistent with the Boy Scouts's
principles and purposes. 84 As the Milivojevich case illustrates, there is an even85
stronger case for deference when dealing with religious organizations.
Accordingly, courts should defer to religious organizations in determining
whether their messages, which may contain both religious and political
undertones, are really religious. For example, when a church announces that it
will withhold communion from members voting for pro-choice political
candidates, courts should accord deference to the church when determining
whether this is really a political act. This would allow religious organizations to
continue espousing religious messages even though those messages might contain
political undertones. It would also allow religious organizations to maintain a
level of autonomy in determining the nature of their own messages-an
important aspect of the Milivojevich decision. 86 Thus, by according deference
to religious organizations, the IRS could avoid the invalidation of its application
of § 501(c)(3) under a Smith hybrid claim.
Clearly, there should be limits on this doctrine of deference, as too much
deference will encourage abuse. A religious organization should not be able to
simply state that its message, which is clearly political, is religious and thus not
a violation of § 50i(c)(3). For instance, a religious organization flatly urging
members to vote for President Bush should not be able to maintain its § 501 (c)(3)
tax-exempt status by merely stating that it was a religious message. Instead,
religious organizations need only be given deference when their messages are
This recognizes that religious
arguably both political and religious.
organizations receive greater constitutional protection than other § 501(c)(3)
of the consideration that they are given under the Free
organizations because
187
Exercise Clause.
CONCLUSION
As the IRS begins to crack down on religious organizations' possible
intervention in political campaigns, religious organizations are altering the nature
of the messages they preach to their congregations. Currently, the IRS treats

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 651-53.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 653.
See id.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
Id. at 698; see supra note 163.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religious organizations no differently than other tax-exempt organizations."'
This general application of § 501(c)(3) does not account for the special First
Amendment concerns that arise when a religious organization's activities are at
issue. It does not provide adequate protection for religious or political speech or
for the free exercise of religion, making the IRS's interpretation of § 501(c)(3)
vulnerable under a Smith hybrid claim. To avoid these constitutional difficulties,
the IRS should defer to religious organizations in determining whether a message
that is arguably both political and religious is a religious one. This doctrine of
deference will become increasingly important for the survival of religious
organizations as political campaigns grow in length and intensity and religion and
politics become even more intricately intertwined.

188. See, e.g., Fund for the Study of Econ. Growth & Tax Reform v. IRS, 161 F.3d 755, 760
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying the general interpretation of § 501(c)(3) to an organization dedicated
to reforming the U.S. tax system); League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379,
383 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (stripping an organization of its 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status because it engaged
in excessive lobbying); see also supra Part I (outlining the IRS's interpretation of § 501(c)(3) as
applied to all § 501(c)(3) organizations).

